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This case study explores the way in which farmers’ organisations in Mali have 
responded to sharp and rapid changes in their institutional environment.  It 
shows how institutional reform (especially when urged or required by donors and 
other external agents) needs to be carefully sequenced, and based on a 
comprehensive understanding of existing economic, political and social 
arrangements and the interrelations between institutional levels.  Otherwise, it 
runs the risk of disrupting economic activity, provoking political reaction and 
resistance, and compromising the purpose of reform.  This case study of the 
institutional reforms of Mali’s Office du Niger (ON) and the Compagnie Malienne 
pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CMDT) dramatically illustrates these 
dangers.  These reforms have been made without adequate consultation, clear 
communication of the intent and content of the reforms, or appropriate regard for 
the implications of high-level reform on local organisations and vice-versa.  The 
response of farmers’ organisations, already overburdened with responsibilities 
beyond their capacity, and threatened with further changes in their own legal 
character, has been negative and has not contributed to the design of new 
institutions.  Understanding and anticipating the politics of organisational 










Mali is a landlocked, partly desert country, one of the least developed in the 
world.  Its economy is dominated by agriculture.  Two areas stand out for having 
received large-scale investment during the colonial and post-colonial eras and for 
the substantial control the government has exerted over smallholder agriculture: 
the Office du Niger (ON), a large scale riverine irrigation scheme, and the cotton 
zone, where agriculture has been dominated by the mixed public-private 
Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Fibres Textiles (CMDT).  Both 
areas have seen major institutional reforms from the 1980s onwards, supported 
by international donors.  These reforms have attempted to liberalise marketing of 
crops and agricultural inputs, decrease bureaucratic control of agriculture, change 
the forms and functions of farmer organisations, and make crop production more 
competitive in a world market.  In their latest manifestations they involve the 
allocation of ON land to large-scale foreign agribusiness, and the privatization of 
CMDT.  In each case, farmers have felt threatened by the reforms or aspects of 
them, and have made counter-demands through their farmer organisations. 
 
Local-level farmer organisations, which have been given additional responsibilities 
as the role of the two parastatals1 contracted, are now themselves subject to 
reforms; broadly speaking enforcing a change from a looser “village association” 
model to a formal co-operative model. 
 
This paper, based on qualitative fieldwork in the ON and the cotton zone, reviews 
the different waves of reform, and the sources of farmer opposition to them.  The 
reforms to the ON and the CMDT are largely driven by inexorable external forces.  
We do not necessarily consider all the criticisms voiced by farmers as well-
founded: whether they are or not, they are unlikely to have much impact.  But we 
conclude that processes of communicating the reforms and the reasons behind 
them have been inadequate, and that the timing of the co-operativization of 
village organisations has caused unnecessary friction. 
                                            
1 The term is used for convenience: the ON bureaucracy and the CMDT have very different legal 
statuses, objectives and roles. 
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2 THE OFFICE DU NIGER 
 
The ON was conceived and established by the French colonial government in 
1932 with a view to developing the French cotton industry as well as becoming 
the granary of West Africa (this dual objective remained after Malian 
independence until 1971, when the policy of growing irrigated cotton was 
discontinued).  It also had a social objective of becoming a pilot region for the 
modernization of African farming.  Farmers from different regions of French West 
Africa, some brought forcibly to the area, were granted renewable tenancies.  
Until 1984, farmers were subject to the “economic police”, a military body in 
charge of ensuring that all produce was sold through government channels (C. 
Coulibaly 1997, cited by Dougnon and Coulibaly 2007).  It is often said in Mali 
that the ON is a state within a state, exerting a state-like control over the lives of 
its tenants. 
 
The ON currently has a cultivated area of 136,000 hectares, with a total farming 
population of over 350,000 (Dougnon and Coulibaly 2007).  
 
Since 1982, the ON has been the subject of major institutional reforms - 
summarised in Table 1 - in particular the transfer to newly-established Village 
Associations of many of the functions: supply of agricultural inputs, facilitation of 
agricultural credit, threshing, and marketing of rice.  From 1994, new committees 
were established to allow farmer participation in land and water management.  
These developments have already been discussed in other IPPG funded work 
(Olukoshi et al. 2007b, Dougnon and Coulibaly 2007) and elsewhere.  Analyses of 
these developments show mixed achievements.  Kater et al. (2000) review both 
technical and socio-economic aspects of soil fertility management, and expresses 
cautious optimism.  Diarra et al. (2000), regard the refom of milling and 
marketing as a success story, while Vandersypen et al. (2006) who question the 
adequacy and sustainability of institutions devolving water management to 
farmers.  In 2001 a new and very different “reform” began: the Malian 
Government started to grant leases in the ON to large-scale agribusiness from 
other countries in the region, and globally. 
   
Table 1: Major Institutional Developments in the Office du Niger, 1982 - 
1982 Beginning of the Netherlands-funded rehabilitation programme ARPON 
(Improvement of the Production of Rice in the Office du Niger). 
1984 Disbanding of the economic police; creation of the first village 
associations, confirmation of policy of intensification and rehabilitation.  
Liberalization of paddy2 marketing.  Transfer to village associations of 
responsibilities for threshing and input supply. 
1988 Loans to farmers for re-equipment through the National Agricultural 
Development Bank. 
1994 Major reforms: disengagement of the ON management from all crop-
marketing activities.  Privatization of some central processing and 
marketing functions.  Redefinition of ON mandate to focus on 
rehabilitation and maintenance of physical works and management of 
water.  Beginning of farmer representation on the Administrative Council 
and Management committee.  Establishment of two high-level joint 
committees of management and farmers, on maintenance of water 
network and on land management and land allocation. 
1995 First Contract Plan over the period 1996–1998 signed between the State, 
the ON and the farmers. The Contract Plan determines the technical, 
financial and institutional engagements of each of the three partners. 
1996 Enactment of Management Decree confirming farmers’ responsibility for 
                                            
2 Rough rice that has not yet been dehusked. 
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tertiary water networks, institution of annual water license for farmers, 
and definition of five forms of leasehold for family farmers and for agri-
businesses. 
1990s Encouragement of crop diversification away from rice to onions, sweet 
potato, tomato etc., especially in 1997-98. 
1997-
98 
Official recognition of farmer unions by ON management 
1998 Evaluation of the first Contract Plan 1996–98.  
Series of Contract Plans covering three-year periods from then onwards. 
2000-
01 




3 THE COTTON ZONE 
 
In the cotton zone, the CMDT was established at independence as a joint venture 
between the Malian government, which took a 60% stake, and the CFDT, a 
French parastatal, which initially retained 40% ownership, subsequently reduced 
to 8%.3  CMDT, and CFDT before it, historically operated an integrated system 
whereby it provided inputs, credit, agricultural research and extension, and a 
number of social-sector activities, and had a monopsony on buying and 
processing the cotton crop (Olukoshi et al. 2007c, see also Tefft 2000).  Farmer 
organisations were established as a subordinate part of this system.  However, 
land in the cotton zone is mainly held under traditional tenure, owned nominally 
by certain “autochthonous” families with usufructuary rights distributed in a 
relatively flexible manner.  
 
From its creation in 1944 to 1988, the CFDT and its successor the CMDT served 
both economic functions (purchasing of cotton, ginning and sale) and social 
functions (education, adult literacy and health).  The first institutional reforms in 
the cotton sector were implemented in 1988 with the adoption of the “Contract 
Plans” which managed the relations between the three principal actors: the state, 
the CMDT and the farmers.  After the 1988 reforms all these functions were 
transferred to Village Associations (Associations Villageoises).  In 1994 a legal 
mechanism was put in place to set the price of cotton before each agricultural 
season, taking into account changes in the world price and CMDT’s costs of 
production.  Also at the beginning of each season there were negotiations 
between the banks, CMDT and the Village Associations on the funding of inputs. 
 
The cotton zone was rocked in 2000/01 by a crisis known as the “cotton strike”.  
Cotton production dropped by a half as the farmers refused to cultivate.  Several 
grievances were cited, including low prices for cotton, widespread indebtedness, 
poor relations between the farmers and CMDT staff, and poor management within 
CMDT.  After the “Etats Généraux”4 for the cotton sector held in 2002, production 
rose again with more favourable prices offered by CMDT, but at the cost of a 
serious financial deficit for CMDT, which led the government to re-examine the 
whole sub-sector and to draft a policy Cotton Sector Policy Paper.  This paper saw 
a progressive withdrawal of government through: 
• Refocusing of CMDT on cotton marketing 
• Withdrawal from extension, input supply and transport 
• Liberalization of prices and marketing of seed cotton 
• Eventual privatization of CMDT (with government to keep only a 20% share)  
 
                                            
3 CFDT is now majority privately owned, and known as Geo-coton 
4 Referring to the consultative assembly of the different social classes in pre-revolutionary France 
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In 2001 the government launched the Initiative for Restructuring of the Cotton 
Sector (Mission de Restructuration du Secteur Cotton - MRSC), so as to build on 
the previous reforms through privatization of the CMDT.  Since then the 
government, under pressure from international donors, has moved towards 
privatization of CMDT, which was finally approved by the Malian Parliament in 
August 2008.    A privatised CMDT will be divided into four companies for the 
geographic sub-zones (South, North, Centre and West).   In each company, 
private-sector operators will take a 61% stake, farmers 20%, CMDT employees 
2% and the government will retain 17%.5  
 
 
4 FARMER REACTIONS TO THE REFORMS 
 
The Office du Niger 
 
Fieldwork carried out under the IPPG programme reveals widespread opposition 
by farmers and their representatives to the recent reforms in the Office du Niger, 
both because they do not go far enough in giving farmer organisations a voice in 
scheme management, and because of land tenure issues. 
 
On scheme organisation, farmer representatives demand: 
• A revision of the Management Decree for the ON, with the active participation 
of farmer organisations 
• A meaningful involvement of farmer organisations in scheme management, 
rather than the current system where they are marginalised or treated as a 
means to an end 
• An equitable joint management of the ON by the government and 
representative farmer organisations. 
 
Land in the ON remains the property of the state.  The 1996 management Decree 
created two categories of farm enterprise: family farms holding land under a 
tenancy contract (either annual or indefinite for more trusted farmers), and large-
scale businesses leasing land long-term.  The leaders of farmer organisations feel 
that there is still inadequate security of tenure for family farmers, and propose 
the extension of long-term leases to family farms.  More generally, it is felt, the 
government should create conditions where farmers can have access to long-term 
loans for new investments in water management. 
 
The leaders of farmer organisations consider that the reforms set private 
investors and family farmers at odds with each other.  Farmers are concerned 
that all the discussions so far on the future of rice production are focussed on 
private investors, to the detriment of the 180,000 families who cultivate land 
under tenancy contracts.  SEXAGON, the most powerful of the unions 
representing farmers, has asked why new initiatives on rice (on credit facilities, 
land tenure, and water quotas) have taken little account of family farmers.  In 
SEXAGON’s view this will lead to a two-speed model of agriculture: on one side 
the private investors in their “pilot zones”, and on the other side smallholders 
with little hope of development.  SEXAGON leaders claim that the granting of 
leases to private investors will ultimately force small farmers out, or at least 
make land unavailable for their children. 
 
The Cotton Zone 
 
During fieldwork carried out under the IPPG programme, farmers and farmer 
leaders were aware of the indispensability of cotton to the national economy, 
                                            
5
 http://www.apanews.net/public/spip.php?article71409  
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attached a strong value to their cotton-growing livelihoods, and articulated radical 
demands to defend them: 
• The total abandonment of privatization 
• The raising of the price for seed cotton 
• The reduction of input prices 
• Improvement in the quality of seed and inputs 
• The cancelling by government of the outstanding debts owed by cotton 
farmers (around FCFA 8 billion or €12 million) 
• The abandonment of credit based on collective liability, so that each farmer is 
only responsible for his own loan 
• Better networking of farmer organisations so they can obtain more 
advantageous farm credit  
• The inauguration of a dialogue and a framework of regular meetings between 
APCAM (the national apex body for farmer organisations), CMDT, the 
Commission for Restructuring the cotton Sector, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
 
In particular, cotton farmers, through their organisations, oppose privatization of 
the CMDT, fearing that the new owners will change the “rules of the game” in 
ways which will disadvantage them, and resenting that privatization is being 
carried out without their consent.  Farmers’ leaders refer to the situation of cotton 
farmers in the neighbouring countries of Burkina Faso, Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, 
where they say that privatization has increased the poverty of farmers.  In 
support of such grievances, allusion is made to the possibility that farmers may 
withdraw their labour and the use of their lands (the two factors of production 
they own) for cotton production.  In the words of one farmer leader:  
  
The government cannot sell our fields and our labour-power.  We will 
make use of them as we like; they are our property.  Our power is not in 
Bamako, it is in our fields. 
 
 
5 FARMER ORGANISATIONS, UNIONS AND CO-OPERATIVES 
 
In both areas, there are a variety of different types of organisations in which 
farmers are involved: 
 
Indigenous or Traditional Organisations 
 
These organisations are embedded in the cultures of the various ethnic groups 
and village communities.  They are characterised by: 
• The power of the village chief and his councillors, traditional but also serving 
as a link to the government, and since 1996 to the new decentralised local 
authorities 
• Structures of mutual aid, manifested in age-based groups and in collaboration 
in collective agricultural work (on both cereals and cotton) 
• Linkages to cultural elements, such as initiation societies. 
 
The cotton zone is dominated by the Bamana (Bambara) and Senoufo, rightly or 
wrongly considered as the most conservative ethnic groups in Mali, and these 
organisations retain their power, and can influence the workings of the newer 
forms of farmer organisations.  In the ON, due to the importation of farmers from 
different ethnic groups and a wide geographical radius, and due to the high 
degree of control exerted by the colonial and post-colonial scheme management, 




Government-Sponsored Farmer Organisations  
 
This category comprises Village Associations, and the closely-related Tons 
Villageois, as well as Co-operatives and Economic Interest Groups.  Such 
organisations are the results of institutional reforms, but largely conceived in the 
image of the traditional organisations.  They were designed to take responsibility 
for village development within the framework of development policies based on 
the principle of transfer of responsibilities to farmers.  They have proved, overall, 
incapable of filling these roles, for reasons to do with: conflicts between their new 
objectives and their traditional management principles; the contradictory 
expectations of the government, ON management and CMDT; and their lack of 




The first trade union (syndicat) organisation in the cotton zone, the Union of 
Producers of Cotton and Staple Crops (Syndicat des Producteurs de Coton et 
Vivriers – SYCOV) was founded in 1992 in response to the international crisis in 
the cotton market which sharply reduced prices for Malian farmers.6  The second 
large scale union, the Union for the Promotion of Cotton and Staple Food Farming 
in Mali (Syndicat pour la Valorization des Cultures Cotonnièrs et Vivrières du Mali 
– SYVAC) resulted from a split in SYCOV but pursued the same goals: to fight for 
a cotton price that was acceptable to farmers and was not dictated by the 
market.  When the National Assembly voted on the bill for the privatisation of the 
CMDT in August 2008 it was the unions which were at the head of the anti-
privatisation campaign. 
 
In the ON, the Union of Farmers of the ON (Syndicat des Exploitants Agricoles de 
l’Office du Niger – SEXAGON) as founded in 1997 to mobilise the peasants around 
important economic questions such as the marketing of rice by peasant 
organisations, the direct access of peasant organisations, without middlemen, to 
the market for agricultural inputs, and a tenure reform favourable to family 
farmers who otherwise seemed to be laid aside in favour of agribusiness.  After 
the adoption of the law on agribusiness, it was SEXAGON which held multiple 
meetings and assemblies in villages and towns to protest against the 
marginalisation of family farming.  However, over time there have been splits in 
the Unions and there are now four in the cotton zone and two in the ON. 
 
Chambers of Agriculture 
 
The Malian Chamber of Agriculture was established as a unique national 
organisation in 1989.  From 1993, the implementation of rural reforms entailed 
the establishment of nine Regional Chambers of Agriculture, all affiliated to the 
Permanent Assembly of Malian Chambers of Agriculture (APCAM).  The 
distinctiveness of this new organisation lies in its membership which combines 
farmer organisations and farmers as individual members.  The Chambers of 
Agriculture have come to be seen as effective representatives of the rural 
population through mobilisation, information-sharing, dispute-resolution, and the 
defence of farmer interests through participation in policy-making. 
 
Also relevant to a description of farmer organisations are political parties.  
Several national-level political parties have taken control of the rural communes 
(municipalities) which came into being with decentralisation in 1999-2000, and 
thus have an impact on rural development in the cotton zone and the ON.  There 
are thus party-political positions on questions of institutional and organisational 
                                            
6 See Bingen 1998, 2000 
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reform in these areas.  The Mayor of a commune can be a leader of several 
different farmer organisations.  Political rivalries within farming communities in 
the cotton zone and the ON are considered one of the sources of weakness of 
farmer organisations.  During the IPPG fieldwork, many informants said that 
farmers were so divided on political lines that they found it hard to agree on 
anything.   
 
Constraints on Farmer Organisations 
 
An earlier round of fieldwork under the IPPG programme in the ON (Dougnon and 
Coulibaly 2007) highlighted a number of factors that had constrained the 
operation of farmer organisation within the ON and in particular the transfer of 
economic responsibilities (for threshing, paddy marketing and input supply. 
  
Table 2: Constraints on Farmer Organisations in the Office du Niger 
Legal Constraints Economic Constraints Social Constraints 
Absence of a legal 
framework 
Over-indebtedness and 
proliferation of the AVs  
Social cohesion crisis 
Limited power for the  
farmer members of the 
joint committees 
Corruption and bad 
management 
Erosion of the work ethic 
 Marketing problems  
 Difficulties of access to 
fertiliser 
 
 Under-equipment and 
shortage of land parcels 
 
 High cost of labour   
Source: Dougnon and Coulibaly 2007 
 
In the cotton zone, the village associations suffer similar problems: 
• A complete absence of legal status 
• Poor management of resources; lack of transparency, embezzlement, and a 
lack of recourse to the courts 
• Poor and undemocratic organisation; failure to call General Assembly 
meetings, accumulation of power by committee members, especially the 
literate ones, poor record-keeping, lack of internal or external audits 
• Factionalism, and failures to find common cause between wealthier and 
poorer families, and between those with and without access to credit. 
 
The capacity of the peasant organisations to effectively influence institutional 
reforms (e.g. the privatisation of the CMDT, the introduction of agribusiness to 
the ON, changes in water pricing) depends critically on their own performance in 
economic and organisational tasks: threshing of rice, weighing of cotton, input 
supply, marketing, management of credit, construction of health centres and 
schools.  The better they perform economically, the more they will have internal 
cohesion and the more they will be able to face up to the state to assert their 
point of view.  However, we estimate that across the two zones, less than 10% of 
farmer organisations are fully functioning. 
  
This inability of farmer organisations to fulfil their agricultural and marketing 
functions, and their tendency to factionalism, limit the capacity of peasant 
organisations to influence or even participate in a unified way in the drafting and 
adoption of laws and regulations in the different waves of reforms that the ON 




In both areas, farmer organisations have been undergoing a significant change– 
they are required to change their legal status from that of Village Association to 
that of Cooperative, more tightly regulated and more explicitly based on ideas of 
solidarity and collective liability, in order to access funds from banks and 
microfinance institutions.   
 
Law No. 88-62/AN-RM of 1988 recognised the basic principles of co-operation, 
but allowed for Village Associations and Tons Villageois as well as more formal 
Co-operatives.  Only one farmer organisation of any sort could be present within 
a village.  The overthrow of the military dictatorship left this law null and void, 
and the replacement, Law No. 01-076 of 2001, explicitly withheld recognition 
from Village Associations, as well as allowing more than one co-operative within a 
village.  In practice, the need for Village Associations to transform themselves 
into co-operatives has been felt since 2004.   
 
The imposition of Co-operatives has set off fierce debates in both the cotton zone 
and the ON as to whether they are the form of farmer organisation best adapted 
to both the history of recent institutional reforms in each area and the recent 
decentralisation of government in Mali.    According to some informants, if 
farmers are not properly trained, co-operatives will experience the same 
problems which crippled the Village Associations.  The key question of the 
institutional reforms is not one of adopting new laws, but of properly 
implementing them.  The questions raised by farmers’ leaders, and also by field-
level government staff, have not yet been answered:  
• How can the Village Associations, crippled by multiple management problems 
over 20 years, transform themselves in short order into effective, market-
driven Co-operatives 
• How can Co-operatives be designed as vehicles for rural solidarity when 
farmers are already protesting the imposition of collective liability for loans 
from banks and microfinance institutions? 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
The Office du Niger and the CMDT are key institutions for agricultural production 
and agricultural export in Mali (Olukoshi et al. 2007a), a country whose economy 
is dominated by agriculture.  They or their successors must therefore be part of 
any Malian strategy for pro-poor growth. They also dominate the lives and 
livelihoods of large numbers of small farmers – livelihoods which are both 
complex and vulnerable.  For example, fertiliser provided through CMDT has also 
had an impact on grain yields, and plough oxen bought when cotton prices were 
high have allowed extensification of grain cultivation (Benjaminsen 2001).  This 
dual aspect increases the stakes in reforming them.  
 
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the reasons for which, and the 
pressures under which, the Malian government has privatised CMDT and 
encouraged investment by agri-business in the ON irrigated zone, or the overall 
appropriateness of those policies.  Nor are we able to present quantitative data 
on agricultural production or farmer incomes.  But qualitative enquiry among 
farmers and farmer leaders each policy has incited fierce opposition among 
farmers and their leaders.   
 
The trend in government policy in Mali since the mid 1980s, which has 
accelerated since democratisation, has been away from dirigiste, bureaucratic 
management of the rural economy and state provision of a wide variety of 
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agricultural and non-agricultural services, towards state withdrawal and 
increasing the responsibilities of farmer organisations. 
 
This policy was surprisingly controversial.  One can argue perhaps that dirigisme 
had become so deeply-rooted that farmers were unable to see the new policies as 
an opportunity but saw them instead as a breaking of a moral relationship – 
“leaving farmers as orphans”.  Whether or not that is the case, both farmer 
acceptance of the new policies and the policies’ effectiveness in stimulating the 
rural economy have been severely weakened.  Factors here have been a) the lack 
of assistance to farmer organisations to fulfil their new roles, leading to 
widespread malfunctioning of farmer organisations, b) the perception that the 
farmers’ organisations did not have policy space to make any real impact on 
policy and institutional set-ups in agriculture, and c) the association in farmers’ 
perceptions with other policies favouring the large-scale private sector.  Against 
this background the attempt to enforce a single organisational model, that of Co-
operatives, has become controversial. 
 
The weakness of farmer organisations has at the same time limited their ability to 
contribute meaningfully to policy debates, at a time when a farmer voice is 
needed.  Overall, experience in the Office du Niger and the cotton zone shows the 
importance of communication of policy decisions, capacity-building of farmer 
organisations to match the responsibilities placed on them, and careful 
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